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COMMENT: INHERENT INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY*
JessieD. Green and SusanWork
Inherent sovereignty is the most basic principle of all Indian law
and means simply that the powers lawfully vested in an Indian tribe
are those powers that predate New World discovery and have never
been extinguished.1 Some of the powers of inherent sovereignty
which have been recognized by the courts are the right to determine
a form of government,2 the power to determine membership, 3 the
application of Indian customs, laws, and tribal jurisdiction to domestic relations4 and descent and distribution of property,5 power
of taxation,6 exclusion of nonmembers from tribal territory,7 power
over tribal property,8 rights of occupancy in tribal lands, 9 jurisdiction
over property of members, 10 and administration of justice."' Whether tribal sovereignty exists by the grace of courteous regard for the
past by the courts, or by the rights of historical precedent ratified in
treaties and statutes by Congress, it is an important past and present
force which sets the Native American people apart from their fellow
Americans. 12
Even though no specific federal statute, constitutional provision,
or executive order establishes or reiterates the concept of inherent
Indian sovereignty, it has been plainly stated by the Supreme Court
to exist.' 3 Having deep historical roots, the inherent sovereignty doctrine has been recognized by the Court as the ordinary, if not the uniform, interpretation of the basis of Indian tribal power.' 4 The doctrine has been challenged as a mere tool used to justify decisions, in
essence making inherent Indian sovereignty a legal fiction of the
courts. Nevertheless, such a view is not readily reflected in the reasoning of recent Court decisions' 6 and is in direct contradiction to
the opinions of many learned writers. Moreover, a denial of the
legal validity of the doctrine of tribal sovereignty ignores or fails to
consider that such sovereignty has in fact been exercised by the
tribes,'" resulting in the preservation of a communal culture in the
face of the adverse individualist influences presented by the dominant culture.' 9
The legal fiction idea bears examination because it points out that
to a large extent the perpetuation of the sovereignty doctrine rests
on governmental branches other than the courts. The court may
hear only those matters where it has jurisdiction, and often that
* Research performed pursuant to a scholarship funded by Native American Legal
Defense and Education Fund under the direction of Vincent Knight.
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jurisdiction is obtained only by the Congress conferring it.20 Furthermore, it has long been the rule of the courts to follow the decisions
of other governmental branches whose special duty is determination
of the recognition of an Indian group as a tribe. 21 Thus, if other
governmental branches refuse to recognize an Indian group as a
tribe, the courts will find no tribal sovereignty to be protected. These
factors mean that to a large extent the sovereignty doctrine rests on
the support of the executive and legislative governmental branches
and without that support, tribal sovereignty would cease to be mentioned in court opinions and relegated to die a slow death in the
speculating minds of knowledgeable writers. The slow death has not
occurred. On the contrary, tribal sovereignty has been recognized
and endorsed in several recent opinions, 2 illustrating the historical
strength of the doctrine.
HistoricalRoots of Sovereignty in CaseLaw
The problem of jurisdiction has plagued Indian tribes from
earliest history. In CherokeeNation v. Georgia,23 the Supreme Court
held that Indian tribes were not foreign nations in the constitutional
sense and that Indian tribes were as a consequence without the jurisdiction of federal courts when suing a state. 4 The decision construed
Indian nations as having a peculiar and unique status in relation to
the United States resembling "that of a ward to his guardian.1 2 Also,
the court declared that Indian nations were so completely under the
sovereignty of the United States that any attempt by a foreign power
to acquire their lands would be viewed as a direct act of hostility
against the United States.2" Cherokee Nation v. Georgia27 relegated
Indian nations to an absolutely dependent position in the legal
redress of wrongs, for sovereign immunity protected the states and
the United States from suit by an Indian nation in the absence of
legislation to the contrary.' Cherokee Nation v. Georgia2 disposed
of the question of whether an Indian nation could exercise sovereign
power in the national sense and began the controversy of what sovereign power an Indian tribe could possess.
0 is considered
Worcester v. Georgia"
the leading case in the field
of Indian sovereignty. Coming shortly after Cherokee Nation V.
Georgia,"'Worcester primarily represented the struggle of an Indian
32
nation to retain self-government in the face of state encroachment.
Although Worcester reaffirmed the dictum of Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia8 that Indians were subject to federal control, 4 it pointed
out that the subjection was wholly in accord with the doctrine of the
law of nations whereby a weaker power does not surrender its right
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to self-government by association with a stronger power and by taking its protection.8 Moreover, the Worcester holding spoke directly
to the continuing struggle of states and Indian nations by holding
that a state has no power over an Indian tribe and that the whole
intercourse between Indian nations and all of the states is6 governed
by the Constitution and laws of the federal government.3
To reach the aforementioned decision, Chief Justice Marshall in
Worcester reflected on the roots of Indian sovereignty that preexisted the United States.3 7 Marshall stated that the rights of European discoverers to the land which they "discovered" gave only the
exclusive right to purchase from those natives who wished to sell as
among Europeans, and that those rights were not founded on the
denial of any Indian rights.38 Worcester viewed the idea that European charters gave the exclusive right to govern as absurd and extravagant, 39 and stated that such grants of power and title between
and among Europeans were blank paper so far as Indians were concerned.40
Looking back on the history of the United States, Chief justice
Marshall commented that because Indian tribes were nations in the
sense that they were capable of war, peace, and self-government,
treaties were sought and obtained by Congress to avoid hostilities
and cement friendships. 41 To construe such treaties by the United
States or its predecessors in interest as a surrender of sovereign Indian rights would, in Marshall's language, "be a perversion of their
[treaties'] necessary meaning, and a departure from the construction
which has been uniformly put on them. ' 42 Worcester explains that
both the treaties and laws of the United States contemplate complete separation between states and Indian nations43 and provide
and protection of Indian rights by the federal govfor the respect
44
ernment.
Worcester has not remained untouched by time, but Williams
v. Lee43 recognized that the basic policy is still relevant. 46 Construing
the Worcester doctrine, the Court stated that "essentially, absent
governing acts of Congress, the question has always been whether
the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them." 47 Following this reasoning,
the Williams Court denied a state court the power to adjudicate a
sale between an Indian and a non-Indian, because it would undermine the authority of tribal courts over reservation affairs.4 8 The
Court was not blind to the then existing legally sanctioned exercises
of state law over Indian reservations and territory, but distinguished
out that such control by state courts
those instances by pointing
49
non-Indians.
involved
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Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones0 stressed that the conceptual
clarity of Worcester has given way to more individualized treatment
of Indians.5 ' Whereas Williams reflected the continuing aspects of
Mr. Marshall's opinion in Worcester,Mescalero presented the image
of the differences between past and present construction. Mescalero
endorsed the Williams infringement test, but rested its decision that
a tribe's ski resort was subject to a state gross receipts tax on the basis
that it was construing a tax matter as to an Indian activity off the
reservation.5 2 McClanahanv. Arizona Tax Commission,"8 noted in
Mescalero,5 4 recognized that some state tax action cases do not turn
on the Indian sovereignty doctrine; 5 however, it held that inherent
Indian sovereignty precluded state taxation of activities or lands
within reservation boundaries absent congressional consent.5 McClanahan,in speaking to the individual treatment concept of Mescalero, pointed to a test used in the past 5 7 to determine whether an
Indian tribe is subject to state control. The determination depended
on whether an Indian tribe had preserved its tribal organization and
was recognized by the federal government as a distinct people.,8 According to the Court, this test still has usefulness, even though other
factors are also involved in decisions concerning tribal sovereignty.5
Although the McClanahanCourt noted that the doctrine of tribal
sovereignty expounded in Worcester has undergone considerable
evolution, 6 the doctrine was construed to be relevant as a backdrop
for the reading of relevant treaties and federal statutes.01 The Court
further enforced such
reasoning by full endorsement of the Williams
62
infringement test.
Inapplicabilityof ConstitutionalRestrictionson Tribal Action
Even though the doctrine of inherent Indian sovereignty may have
been modified since Worcester, federal courts have refused to extend
constitutional restrictions over Indian tribal activities and have adhered strictly to inherent sovereignty as the reason for such a steadfast position.6" Elk v. Williams6 4 stated that general acts of Congress
do not apply to Indian tribes unless a clear manifest intent is so
expressed. 65 With such a background, consistency required that general constitutional provisions receive the same treatment.0 Thus, in
Talton v. Mayes67the Court held that Indian nations were not subject to fifth or fourteenth amendment restrictions." Talton's conclusion was the logical extension of tribal sovereignty" and case
wording clearly explained that the decision rested on inherent Indian
sovereignty.70 By setting out that the origin of tribal power does not
spring from the United States, Talton presented a case which con-
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tinued the reliance on the Worcester doctrine and emphasized that
Indian tribes are not federal entities.7 1 Even though Talton was decided some time ago,72 more recent opinions indicate that its decision
has remained intact.
In 1968 Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act.1 3 Expressing concern that individual Indians had no personal rights in
situations involving conflicts between the tribe and the individual, 74
Congress by statute enumerated specific rights which are not to be
abridged by tribal government. These rights are those found in
amendments one, four, five, six, seven, and eight of the United States
Bill of Rights, with some variations. 5 The Act also contained the requirement that a tribe will not deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws
and a prohibition against bill
76
of attainder and ex post facto laws.
This Indian Bill of Rights was an infringement on tribal sovereignty and has been criticized, particularly because it did not allow
for tribal consent to its application. But some of the lower federal
courts have indicated that there is nothing in the Act showing that
Congress intended to sweep aside the doctrine of Indian sovereignty.78 Following this observation, the Fourth Circuit in Crowe -V.
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc.,79 held that although the
Cherokee tribal action was properly set aside for failure to comply
with due process and equal protection, the district court was not empowered by the Act to go further and substitute its judgment on the
merits for that of the tribe. The court emphasized that the controversy, which involved tribal lands, was not to be resolved by the
common law, but in light of the traditions and customs of the Indian
tribe, 0 and remanded the case to the tribal court.
A literal reading of the due process and equal protection provisions
in the Indian Bill of Rights to mean the same standards as applied
to state and federal governments could result in seriously undermining the tribes' cultural autonomy."' Some courts have found different
standards applicable, while others have indicated that traditional
Anglo standards are appropriate.8 2 The ultimate development of a
rule in this area will be determinative of the extent to which tribal
sovereignty has been undermined by the restrictions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968.3 Some courts have reasoned that, in effect, it
waived tribal sovereign immunity, and by virtue of the equal protection and due process clause, granted the courts subject matter
jurisdiction over matters previously characterized as internal affairs
beyond the federal courts' jurisdiction. 4 Thus, the full impact of
the Indian Bill of Rights on tribal sovereignty is yet to be determined.
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FederalControlOver Indian Sovereignty
As surely as Worcester established inherent Indian sovereignty as
a bar to state interference with Indian self-government, Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia,85 decided before it, established the federal government as a superior authority over Indian nations.80 Although this
conclusion may have had its foundation in pure coercion, it is doubtful whether a challenge to its legitimacy would succeed.87 Court
holdings have long indicated that Indians do not exercise sovereignty
of the same nature as that exercised by the federal government or
even by the states.88 Standing in the peculiar position of an Indian
tribe under the Constitution,89 an Indian tribe in effect bears the
same relationship to the federal government as a territory in that it
is a secondary government which may exercise complete jurisdiction
over its members within its boundaries, subordinate only to the expressed limitations of federal law.90
The Nature of PlenaryPower
The control exercised by Congress over Indian tribes is so extensive that characterization of such power as plenary is justified., 1 Although plenary power is generally considered to originate from the
wardship status, the commerce clause, and treaty implication, courts
have not defined its exact origin. 2 Worcester stated that Indian
tribes were within the ambit of federal supervision, 3 but plenary
power is more far-reaching. After review of previous cases 4 and consideration of the impact of the mention of Indian tribes in the commerce clause, 95 United States v. Kagama,0 relying on Cherokee Nad97 reasoning, held that the wardship status of Indians
tion v. Georgia
formed a basis for invoking the power of Congress to make criminal
laws applicable to Indian tribes for the Indians' own protection.08
The opinion in Kagama, however, was carefully worded and did not
preclude use of the commerce clause as a foundation for congressional action in the proper situation. 9
Although Kagama reached beyond the holding in both Cherokee
Nation and Worcester and embroidered on the dictum of those
cases, it did not reach as far as Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.100 In discussion of the plenary power of Congress over Indians, Lone Wolf
stated that Congress had exercised the power over Indians from the
very beginning and that the power is of a political nature not subject
to judicial control or review. 1 1 This Lone Wolf dictum points out
that where important questions of plenary power are involved, the
Court may describe the issues presented
as political in nature and
10 2
decline to adjudicate the matter.

316
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Although the plenary power of Congress over Indians is of a
broad nature, it is not absolute. 10 3 Plenary power is only a complete
power when exercised completely, and therein lies tribal sovereignty.
The statutes of Congress only operate as limitations rather than
determinations. 10 4 What is not expressly limited or expressly abrogated remains within the domain of Indian determination by virtue
of the doctrine of inherent sovereignty. 10 5
Vague or doubtful inferences drawn from congressional action do
not extend to take away Indian sovereignty. 106 Good faith is demanded on the part of the United States in all exercises of control
and management of Indian affairs.'0 7 Even Worcester noted that
the language of treaties was to be construed as understood by the
Indians, rather than according to the technical meaning of words as
understood by legal minds. 0 Under no circumstances is treaty language to be construed to Indian prejudice. 0 9 This same high degree
of good faith extends to congressional action in the field of statute
making as well as the area of treaty ratification. All statutes which
affect Indian tribes are to be liberally construed with all questionable
expressions being resolved in the Indians' favor.110 True, the plenary
power of Congress is broad, but the good faith implied in all congressional action serves to have the court act with forbearance when
any congressional action might infringe on an Indian tribe's inherent
sovereignty.
The good faith demands of the exercise of plenary power is supplemented by the demand that all legislation be designed for the protection and best interests of Indians."' Kagama, which pointed to
wardship as at least one basis of the plenary power of Congress,
stressed that protection was a duty of Congress arising from the
Indians' own inability to protect themselves due to intercourse with
the federal government." 2 Lone Wolf extended Kagama's view of
legislative power by stating that Congress had the power to govern
Indians by direct statute, and pointed out that such legislation must
be in the best interest of the Indians themselves. 3 An example of
good faith, protection, and best interest demands is seen in Kennerly
v. DistrictCourt."4 There Congress passed a measure which would
15
allow a state to extend its laws over Indian tribes and reservations."
Kennerly, stating that Congress had not expressly extended state
jurisdiction, held that the state had not complied with the explicit
requirements of the act and denied the state jurisdiction. The demands of good faith, protection, and best interests toward Indians
in legislation require exacting compliance with congressional action
before plenary power seriously infringes on the concept of tribal selfgovernment.
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If, on the other hand, the requirements set out by Congress are
explicitly followed by states and Congress expresses an intent to
abrogate Indian sovereignty, then at that time the plenary power
would be absolute. There seems to be no doubt that Congress could
abolish Indian tribes immediately if it saw fit."" It has long been
pointed out by the courts that Congress may directly overrule treaty
provisions. 117 The other party to the treaty could have an action for
breach of the agreement, but only if the United States submits itself
to the jurisdiction of a legal forum where the cause may be heard and
judgment rendered." 8 The old case law which points out that Congress may terminate a tribe directs that such be done in good faith
on the part of Congress, with Indian protection and the Indians'
best interests in mind.1 9 Nevertheless, the forum problem may well
prevent any court adjudication of such, for in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock 20 it was stated that the courts presume the perfect good faith
of Congress.' 2' The plenary power of Congress is certainly broad,
but it is not absolute until absolutely exercised and for the present
there is no such explicit action contemplated by Congress. 22
ConstitutionalSources of PlenaryPower
The plenary power of Congress over Indian tribes arises at least
in part from the constitutional powers of Congress to ratify treaties,
to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, and to admit new
states. 23 Worcester referred to the constitutional powers involved
in treaty-making 24 and commerce regulation 125 as the authorization
of exclusive federal control over Indian nations. 20 Further, the constitutional power of Congress to admit new states 27 has allowed the
federal government to retain exclusive power, because Congress, by
enabling act legislation, has forced new states to deny any claim of
2
jurisdiction over Indian affairs.'
History, as well as the Constitution, indicates that the federal government has exclusive and absolute treaty powers. 29 This is a source
of the plenary power of Congress, but the primary source is considered to be the commerce clause. 8 0 The commerce clause authorizes
Congress to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, but the question of the exclusiveness of the nature of that federal power has been
questioned on occasion by states.' 3 ' Such questioning has been vigorously answered by the Court, which held that the congressional
power was both exclusive of state action and absolute in its field of
exercise. 32 United States v. Nice 33 construed the exercise of commerce control to be exclusively vested in the federal government by
virtue of the commerce clause of the Constitution and the wardship
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status expounded in Kagama.3 Moreover, if the wardship status of
Indians has always existed, as Kagama implies, 135 then it is possible
that all constitutional sources of plenary power over Indians are
derivatives of that status.
Whether the wardship status of Indians is responsible for the constitutional provisions, the constitutional provisions responsible for
wardship, or a third force responsible for creating the two former, it
remains that wardship provides Congress with virtually unlimited
power over Indians.136 With roots in Cherokee Nation,18 7 explanation in Kagama,138 and extrapolation in Lone Wolf, 3 9 wardship has

emerged as a broad, well-documented concept consisting of the peculiar relation of Indians and the federal government which justifies
4
federal protection.140 Wardship, with its potential for Indian abuse1 '
as well as Indian benefit, 42 has left one area less than fully defined:

whether wardship is a federal duty borne of choice or of obligation.
Kagama, in its early explanation of wardship, said that the duty
"must" exist with the federal government because Indian weakness
43
was due in large to intercourse with the federal government.
Board of County Commissionersv. Seber, 44 in construing Kagama,
stated that the duty was assumed by the federal government of necessity. 45 However, such a recognition of duty was commensurate with
an immediate need for protection. 46 And the Court in later dictum
pointed out that it was within congressional power to choose when
the wardship status would cease to exist. 47 The power of wardship
termination would be consistent with the plenary power of Congress,
but the recent decision of Williams v. Lee 48 states that Indian independence was "exchanged" for federal protection. 49 Consistent with
such an exchange concept is the implication of an agreement or
contract, which might form a basis for an unending wardship duty.
However the nature of the duty of wardship is viewed, whether of
choice or of obligation, it is a presently continuing rather than an
extinguished method of federal supervision and protection of the
Indian tribes. Although some treatise writers feel the government
has wearied of its role as guardian, 5 ° appropriations statutes indicate
otherwise.' 5 ' Moreover, the Court has pointed out that as long as the
federal government recognizes the Indian tribes as possessing attributes of national character or attributes of the tribal relationship, the
wardship status continues.5 2 Furthermore, the conferring of rights
58
and privileges on Indians does not change the wardship situation.
Although In re Hef 54 stated that once citizenship is granted to
Indians they are outside federal control, the Court by specific reference later overruled such a stand,'5 5 because congressional intent
reflected by later enactments was not as the Court had earlier in319
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terpreted. 156 The on/off status of wardship in this era was confusing,
to say the least,15 7 especially when allotment in severalty was adjudged not to affect Indian guardianship.5 8 Citizenship rights were
conferred on all Indians born in the United States after 19z4,11 and

if the In re Heft ruling had continued to be enforced, the special
relationship of the American Indian with the federal government
and possibly Indian sovereignty might well have been relegated to a
historical study. But because Indian wardship has continued, Indian
sovereignty has continued, and Indian citizenship has been granted,
the Native
American has a tripartite status unique in American so160
ciety.
All in all, federal control over Indian tribes is awesome. On occasion Congress has even disbanded tribes, 16 thus terminating their
recognition by the federal government, which includes court standing and wardship protection. Even the direct constitutional control
over commerce with Indian tribes is unavailing to protect Indian
tribes from state encroachment, if the tribal relationship is no longer
recognized. Nevertheless, for that awesome power to be felt it must
be exercised and as long as the federal government refrains from
the exercise of the power of termination, inherent Indian sovereignty can be a powerful force.
InherentSovereignty in aHistoricalPerspective
Court decisions rarely, if ever, give voice to a completely original
doctrine, and inherent Indian sovereignty is no different. As the
Court pointed out in Worcester, the origin of Indian sovereignty
reaches to roots which predate European discovery of the North
American continent. 62 There seems little doubt that at one time
Indians were in fact completely independent sovereign entities. 10
The British treated the Indian nations as sovereigns' and the Americans initially followed their example, although primarily as a war
measure. 65 Implicit in that treatment by the negotiation of treaties
was the notion of the independence of Indian tribes. 00 Noting the
subject matter of treaties-war powers, 0 7 boundary and frontier
regulation,6 s passports,'16 and extradition7 0-_it is easily understood
that the treaties are7 indicative of an international rather than national relationship.' '
Generally, until the year 1829, the federal government continued
to act under the traditions of a time when colonists were contending
with the tribes for possession of the continent, and dealt with them
under principles of international law.'72 But, there were indications
of a policy change earlier, in fact some authors point out that the
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change actually began immediately after the Revolution.173 Congress unilaterally regulated trade and intercourse with Indians for
the first time in 1790.174 Such regulation did not necessarily impinge
on Indian independence, for the regulations may be construed as a
limit on the intercourse United States citizens were allowed with
Indians and an action akin to the requirement of passports for entry
into Indian country.175 In 1817 Congress passed a measure which
extended federal criminal jurisdiction over all offenses committed
within the Indian country except those offenses committed by one
Indian against another and except those tribes which had treaties to
the contrary. 7 6 This action definitely infringed on any international

relationship, and at the time was questioned in its breadth by some
courts. In 1819, $1o,ooo per year was appropriated toward employment of teachers for the Indians.'7 This action, which strength-

ened the Cherokee Nation 79 and Kagama'8 ° wardship claims,' 8'
could be explained as merely a grant-in-aid to a friendly sovereign
nation in need, although reflection in retrospect might reveal otherwise.
Treaty Period
The year 1829 marked the beginning of the treaty period of United
States dealings with Indian tribes. The growing power of Anglo
civilization, marked by the administration of Andrew Jackson, initiated this period, which is characterized by compulsory emigration
under the form of consent by voluntary treaty. 18 2 Although com-

pulsion was new, the policy of removal was not. Efforts were made
183
in colonial days to remove Indians to unsettled lands in the west.
In 38o2, Georgia surrendered its claim to western lands to the federal government in a cession known as the Georgia Compact, which
provided that the United States extinguish Indian title to all lands
in Georgia as soon as possible.8 4 Even the Louisiana Purchase of
1803 was made, according to President Jefferson, with a view of
furnishing a new area for the habitation of eastern Indian tribes.', 5
During this period, the Supreme Court entered the area of policy,
giving landmark decisions in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia8 and
Worcester v. Georgia.87 Whatever cruelties may be chargeable to
other governmental branches in this period, the courts always maintained the obligations of good faith due the Indians from the federal government.' 88 Although the Court did not accord Indian tribes
the status of independent nations,8 9 it recognized in this era that
Indian tribes were distinct,
independent communities under ex10
control.
federal
clusive
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The legislative policy prevalent in this period was isolation of the
Indians.' 9 1 In 1830 Congress made provisions for the exchange of
Indian lands in the East for lands in the West, and for removal of
the Indians involved across the Mississippi River.192 The Commissioner of Indian Affairs was created in 1832, to proscribe and manage Indian affairs. 1 3 To complement that action, Congress created
the Bureau of Indian Affairs in 1834. 94 After 1837, Indians no longer
received direct payment for lands ceded or sold, as Congress provided
that the proceeds of such sales were to be kept in the Treasury for
Indian benefit." 5 Couched in phrases proclaiming benefit and protection of Indians, Congress passed other measures which narrowed
the Indians' ability to determine their future, deteriorated tribal
autonomy, and compelled the status of wardship. l Indian nations
became tribes and the gap between them and sovereign nations was
widened in the eyes of Congress and the courts. Finally, in 1871, in
a rider tacked at the end of an Indian appropriations act, Congress
legislated away the Indian tribes' right to contract with the United
States by treaty.1' 7 Thus a new period was ushered 8in where Indian
tribes were controlled by agreement and statute.'
Agreement Period
The end of treating with Indian tribes is illustrative of the struggle
that took place between federal governmental branches in the period
that immediately followed. Congress was in essence struggling for
control of Indian policy and striving to find the best means to attain
such control. The amendment of 1871 narrowed the scope of executive power over Indian affairs because it ended the executive negotiation of treaty terms with Indian tribes.'99 However, although
executive power was narrowed, it was not yet destroyed because
although treaties were forbidden to be made after March 3, 1871,20
contracted agreements were not and thus such a means was pursued
by the executive branch in an effort to confine Indians on reservations of ever shrinking dimensions.20 '
It is doubtful that any essential difference between treaty and
agreement was noticed by the Indian tribes. Although certainly the
1871 action of Congress indicates the doctrine of Indian sovereignty
was accorded much less deference by Congress than other federal
governmental branches, 202 this is not to say that the executive branch
honored the letter and spirit of the treaties negotiated. The Indian
tribes were forced by the executive power of the army to keep treaty
and agreement terms, while Anglo settlers invaded their reservations
and broke those terms. 203 When Indians complained, they were
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forced to surrender the part of their lands desired by Anglo settlers
or lose their tribal integrity to the Anglo influx. 20 4 Faced with the

reality of the situation Indian lands shrunk, but tribal integrity and

self-government were maintained. 20 5 Because treaties were so easily

set aside by the compulsion of the Anglo populace, agreements were
no actual step down for Indian tribes. The contract that an agreement embodied was just as powerful and as enforceable as treaties
ratified by Congress. 0 6
In 1883 the Court protected Indian sovereignty by denying federal
court jurisdiction to prosecute the killing of one Indian by another. 20 7 Congress, voicing its disapproval of the situation of Indian
justice and directly infringing on inherent Indian sovereignty, extended federal jurisdiction in 1885 over the seven major offenses of
murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson,
burglary, and larceny committed by one Indian against another in
Indian country.20 8 This congressional action did not, however, abro-

gate existing treaties and thus those Indian tribes with the foresight
to provide for exclusive Indian jurisdiction were unaffected by that
20 9

legislation.

The executive control over Indians accomplished by forced negotiation was contested by Congress in 1871, and won by Congress in
1886 as the Court in United States v. Kagama 10 established Congress as the Indian policy-making power.2 11 Even as early as 1846, it
was implied that Congress could govern Indians by direct legislation. 12 Kagama, a landmark decision, questioned the validity of the
1885 Seven Major Offenses Act 218 and found that Indian people are
subject to the authority of congressional legislation. 1 4 Because treaty
abrogation was not an issue, the question of the extent of congressional power was unanswered in Kagama, but Indian self-government was held vulnerable to invasion by direct congressional legislation. The decision ended the executive power over the Indian
tribes because the semblance of negotiation was no longer required.
AssimilationPeriod
Kagama is interpreted by some authors as recognizing a duty on
the part of the federal government to "civilize" the Indian by legislative means.215 Such an interpretation, even if not intended by the
Court, was certainly apprehended by Congress, or so its action reflects. From the time it first fought for Indian policy control in 1871,
Congress set as a goal the elimination of Indian tribal structure and
the assimilation of the Indians into Anglo society.2 16 The General
Allotment Act of 1887217 is typical of that goal. It was the first of
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many allotment acts21 8 which were designed to force individual
ownership of tribal lands so as to terminate the age-old Indian practice of holding land in common. 19
Allotment in severalty's purpose was to force the Indian to indulge
himself in the habits of "civilized life" and create a surplus of land
for further white settlement 2° The latter conclusion as to purpose
is well supported by the fact that tribal holdings shrank from
155,632,312 acres in 3883 to 52,651,343 acres in 1933.221
During the late i8oo's it was becoming apparent that the property
222
rights of the Indians were rapidly increasing in pecuniary value.
In all fairness to Congress, the pressures to open Indian land to
Anglo settlement were tremendous. 228 The welfare of the nation
Congress represented demanded the efficient use of the lands within
its borders and the Indian utilization of those lands not only did not
contribute to this national demand, but represented a hinderance
on it.224 The purpose of the General Allotment Act represented a
confrontation between Indian self-determination and the needs of a
growing nation. The result was that the Act wrecked the land base
of Indian tribes with experience showing that allotted lands and the
Indian soon parted.225
Congress, confronted with the resistance of the tribes to allotment
and the problems which allotments would create, 220 became generally inattentive to Indian matters227 and let allotment proceed at
a moderate pace. The longer complete allotment took, the more
time Congress had to realize that the habits of ten thousand years
could not be repealed by handing the Indians a piece of paper.22 81
Confronted with Anglo society, which was usually discriminatory
and often hostile, the Indian allottee found himself in an environment to which he could not quickly adjust; consequently, the usual
course of events
led to the Indians' loss of lands and an impoverished
29
condition.
During this assimilation period the judiciary was not silent. Reinforcing the Kagama decision, the In re Mayfield 23 ° opinion delivered in 1891 repeated that Indian tribes were subject in the exer23
cise of their sovereignty to congressional action3.
Recognizing that
the Court is bound to respect congressional policy and construe all
action in consonance with such policy, the Court determined that
Indian self-government was on the same policy level as assimilation
through "civilization." ' 2 The assimilation attempts of Congress,
pursued chiefly by allotment of lands in severalty and to a lesser
extent by the granting and later imposition of citizenship status on
Indians, 23" made congressional policy difficult for the Court to understand. Thus, in 1905, in the case of In reHeff,234 the Court decided
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that Congress had embarked on a new policy looking toward the
end of the exercise of Indian sovereignty. 35 However, in 1916,
United States v. Nice," 6 which explicitly overruled In re Heff,
pointed out that although the General Allotment Act of 188723' did
contemplate that the tribal relation of Indians was to be dissolved, it
was not to occur when allotments were completed or citizenship
undertaken. It stressed that Congress alone has the power to determine if, when, and how dissolution will occur. 2 8
The assimilation period represents a time when congressional
policy lacked respect for tribal sovereignty and thus for the tribal
entity. By choosing to deal with Indians on an individual rather than
the traditional tribal basis, Congress attempted immediate induction
of Indians into the Anglo civilization. In its efforts to strip Indians
of their own culture and communal society by allotment acts, the
government seriously infringed on tribal self-determination, integrity, and culture. 2 9 The adverse effects of the policy of assimilation
compelled remedial action 4° and brought about a complete reversal
of congressional policy. 241
PresentPeriod
Because the anticipated assimilation of Indians into Anglo society
did not occur,242 and because Indian sovereignty was preferred over
Indian destruction, Congress passed the Wheeler-Howard Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934.243 The Act is the last universally recognized major policy revision dealing with Indians244 and represents
a congressional policy designed to utilize the local self-governing
capacity of Indian tribes.24 5 At least once since 1934 there has been a
serious erosion of that policy, 246 but subsequent action of Congress
indicates that the erosion has been curtailed.
Although held by the Court to be an abrupt change, 4' 7 the policy
revision of 1934 was not an overnight project. In 1928 the Meriam

Report, 48 published at the request of Secretary of the Interior Hubert Work,249 pointed out that the two most serious deficiencies in
Indian administration were the exclusion of Indians from managing
their own affairs and the poor quality of public service rendered by
public officials. 250 In 1929 President Hoover appointed a new Bureau of Indian Affairs Commissioner who inaugurated a determined
effort to do away with the major legal discriminations suffered by
Indians. 51 In 1932 Congress passed the Leavitt Act, 252 which canceled a mass of debts unjustly attached to Indians by past administrations for wasteful, unneeded projects. 253 Thus, Congress began
to change its mood at least two years before the Indian Reorganization Act changed basic Indian policy.
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The Wheeler-Howard Act, passed during the presidency of Frank25 4
lin D. Roosevelt, could easily be called the "Indian New Deal."
As an answer to a century of abuse and maltreatment inflicted on a
nearly helpless minority,255 the Act recognized the importance of
the integrity and cohesiveness of the tribe in the social, political,
and economic aspects of Indian life. 50 For those tribes who voluntarily submit themselves to organization under the Act, substantial
benefits are available. Although election under the Indian Reorganization Act is purely voluntary, 95 of z72 federally recognized tribes
have been incorporated and chartered pursuant to the Act.25 7 Provisions of the Act 258 include the end of land allotment in severalty,
extension of trust or other protective restrictions on land already
allotted, restoration of surplus lands to tribal ownership, authorization of the purchase of new lands for tribes, and the confirmation of
numerous inherently sovereign powers. 25 Through such provisions,
Indian tribal government was strengthened and revitalized with an
eye toward encouraging Indians to retain their communal way of
life and oexercise the inherent power of self-government they
2
possess.
After the 1934 policy of Indian self-determination was inaugurated by Congress, other significant legislation followed. In 1935
Congress set up a special agency to assist Indians in marketing their
native arts and crafts products.2 1 This exemplified the about-face in
Indian policy, for after a century of efforts to eradicate the Indian
culture, Congress was now subsidizing it.212 Congress granted tax
exemptions to Indian homesteads purchased with Indian trust funds
in 1936263 and extended provisions similar to the Wheeler-Howard
Act to Oklahoma tribes, who had been previously exempted.204
The Supreme Court in 1938 recognized that minerals and timber
on Indian lands belonged to Indians and not the government. 205
Congress acted immediately on the basis of that decision and assured
200
Indians the right to lease their own minerals.
The year 1940 saw Congress refund taxes that Indians had been
forced to pay when trust-exempt estates were terminated without
Indian consent. 17 Again, in 1941, the Supreme Court construed
Indian land title-holding to be that Indians have legal title to lands
which they had occupied from time immemorial without regard to
formal treaty confirmation. 08 In an effort to free Indians from any
burden they might feel from government protection, Congress, in
1948, conferred upon the Secretary of the Interior authority at his
discretion to issue fee patents to land and remove restrictions on
alienation and allotment for those Indian individuals who applied.200
At this point in time Indians could choose in which "civilization"
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or culture they wished to belong 270 Indian tribes still retained

enough sovereign powers to protect themselves and their members,
but for Indian individuals who wished to assimilate with the Anglo
society provisions were made so that the desired assimilation could
be accomplished.
The choice of closer ties with the states and Anglo culture was
available not only to Indian individuals, but to tribes as well. After
the tribes affected,
consultation by the Bureau of Indian Affairs with
2 72
271
criminal jurisdiction was transferred to Kansas, North Dakota,

Iowa,27 3 New York, 274 and California.27 5 Under this same consulta-

tion method, California obtained civil jurisdiction over one reservation in 1949278 and in 195o New York obtained civil jurisdiction over
the Indian tribes within its borders. 7 The delegation of civil jurisdiction to a state by the federal government is a serious infringement
on the inherent sovereignty of a tribe, for it withdraws intra-tribal
disputes from tribal determination. Yet, such action is well within
the wardship power 278 of the federal government and could be considered a policy shift away from Indian self-determination. One
prominent author notes such a move from 1948, the time Indian
individuals were allowed to petition for fee patents. 279 However,
congressional action, such as the enlarging of the Rocky Boy's Reservation in Montana in 1950,280 is inconsistent with such a conclusion.
Any inconsistencies in congressional action were overcome in 1953
when Public Law 28o was passed. 281 The mood of Congress had
definitely changed.282 As an attempt at compromise between wholly
abandoning jurisdiction over Indians to the states and maintaining
them as wards subject only to federal or tribal jurisdiction, 83 the
statute transferred to five states and offered all others civil and criminal jurisdiction over reservation Indians, 284 but did not terminate
trust status.2 85 The legislation was without question an infringement

on Indian sovereignty because jurisdiction was granted to the states
involved and given to those that desired it without regard to tribal
consent.2 0 As compromises often do, Public Law 28o left both the
respective Indian tribes and the states dissatisfied-the Indians due
to lack of state protection and the states because of the inability
2 87
to finance their responsibilities in the newly acquired jurisdiction.
In 1954 Congress took even stronger action by passing termination
acts for several tribes2 88 and in 1956 continued the tactic.2 89 In 1958
Alaska was added to the Public Law 280 states which mandatorially

have jurisdiction over Indian tribes. 90
The aforementioned action of Congress was so forceful that one
Supreme Court opinion ventured to recognize it as a new period of
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assimilation. 291 Plainly the legislative branch undertook a new direction in 1953 and some experts view the action as a wearying of the
federal government of its guardianship role.29 2 However, such conclusions are not supported by further legislation as the forceful action
came to a standstill. Congress found termination acts were more
easily passed than implemented,"'8 and the response to Public Law
29 4
28o by optional states was not great.
Congress failed to produce broad legislation during the early
196o's and not until 1968 was any policy direction implied by legislation. At that time Congress provided in the Civil Rights Act of
1968 actions indicated that no policy of assimilation was in force or
diction without Indian consent and also authorized states to return
jurisdiction to the federal government. 2 6 Actions consistent with
wardship and Indian self-determination continued, for in 1970 the
Secretary of Agriculture was authorized to make loans to tribal corporations established under the Indian Reorganization Act, 297 Quapaw Indian restrictions were extended an additional 25 years from
1971,298 and the act dealing with final disposition of the Choctaw
Tribe was repealed. 299 In 1972 Indian tribes were authorized to participate in federal revenue-sharing funds.30 0 Although these post1968 actions indicate that no policy of assimilation was in force or
if in force was terminated, in 1973 doubts were resolved as Congress
repealed the Act terminating the Menominee Indians and reinstated all rights and privileges of the tribe.8 0'
Current federal policy is designed to encourage stronger tribal
governments, 0 2 which was the object of the 1934 policy change. The
shift in congressional mood in the 1950's was relatively short-lived
and had some distressing consequences. 30 But plainly it represents
that Indian tribes are no longer immune from state control as early
Supreme Court decisions intimate. 0 4 The early complete exclusion
of states from intercourse with Indian tribes has been undermined
and the pattern of that erosion is not yet clear. 8°5
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356 U.S. 960, reh. denied, 3 57 U.S. 92 4 (1957).
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OriginalIndian Title, 32 MINN. L. R-v. 28, 54-55 (1947).
269. 62 Stat. 236 (1948).
270. Goldberg, Public Law 28o: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 535, 540 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Goldberg].
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defined by the laws of the United States committed by or against Indians on Indian
reservations. This statute was repealed by 62 Stat. 1161 (1948) and jurisdiction is now
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bodies of New York tribes to declare those tribal laws and customs which they desire
-to preserve, which will be published in the Federal Register and govern in all civil
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cases involving reservation Indians when the subject matter of such tribal laws and
customs is involved, and provides: "Nothing herein contained shall be construed to
prevent such courts from recognizing and giving effect to any tribal law or custom
which may be proven to the satisfaction of such courts. .. ." The act also protects
Indian lands from taxation, execution sales, and alienation, protects hunting and
fishing rights. In Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 663, 68o
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and state officials agreed that the bill would retain ultimate federal power over the
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later subjected to state jurisdiction in 68 Stat. 795 (1954). See S. REP. No. 2223,
8 3 d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). See also Oliver, supra note 12, at 238-45.
285. 28 U.S.C. § 2 4 6o(b) (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1970). In 1954 an act
was passed providing for the termination of the federal trust relationship as to property
of mixed blood Utes in Utah, making federal legislation inapplicable to them, making
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287. Goldberg, supra note 270, at 538, 551-58. "Local governments acquiring
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probation and parole officers, and more juvenile aid officers, and to build new police
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PL 28o such as fines and court costs were clearly inadequate; estimates based on
federal experience indicated such funds would cover only about io percent of all
newly-acquired law enforcement expenses.... Financial hardship for the states translated into inadequate law enforcement for the reservations."
288. 68 Stat. 250 (1954), 25 U.S.C. § 891-902 (1976) (Menominee Indian Tribe);
68 Stat. 718 (1954), 25 U.S.C. § 564 (1970) (Klamath Indian Tribe); 68 Stat. 724
(1954), 25 U.S.C. § 691 et seq. (1970) (Western Oregon Indian tribes); 68 Stat.
868 (1954) (Ute Indian Tribe); 68 Stat. 1o99 (1954), 25 U.S.C. § 841 et seq.
(1970) (Ottawa Tribe of Northeast Oklahoma).
289. 70 Stat. 545 (1958), amending i8 U.S.C. § 1162. Some Indian country in
Alaska was later exempted from state jurisdiction by 84 Stat. 1358 (1970).
290. Id.
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292. Oliver, supranote 12, at 241.
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293. Expenses were great and required appropriations legislation for the expenses
and delays were not uncommon. For example, see 71 Stat. 26o (1957); 71 Stat. 347
(1957); 72 Stat. 158 (1958); 7z Stat. 29o (1958); 73 Stat. 95 (1959); 74 Stat. 867
(196o).
294. See Goldberg, supranote 270.
295. 25 U.s.c. § 1321-26 (1970). The Act also protected Indian hunting and
fishing rights from state control.
296. 25 U.s.C. § 1326 (1970). Also in the 1968 Civil Rights Act, Congress subjected tribes to limitations known as the Indian Bill of Rights, discussed supra. See
2 5 U.S.C. § 130z (1970).
297. 84 Stat. 120 (1970); 25 U.S.C. § 488 et seq. (1970).
298. 84 Stat. 325 (1970).
299. 84 Stat. 828 (1970).
3oo. 86 Stat. 925 (1 97 2); 31 U.S.C. § 1227 (1970).
301. 87 Stat. 770 (1973); 25 U.S.C. § 903 (Supp. III 1973).
302. Goldberg, supra note 27o, at 594. In 1971 Congress acknowledged a policy
of Indian self-determination in Senate Concurrent Resolution z6, passed on December 11, 1971, which states in part: "That it is the sense of Congress that-(i) our
national Indian policy shall give full recognition to and be predicated upon the unique
relationship that exists between this group of citizens and the Federal Government
and that a government-wide commitment shall derive from this relationship that
will be designed to give Indians the freedom and encouragement to develop their
individual, family, and community potential and to determine their own future to the
maximum extent possible.... (3) improving the quality and quantity of social and
economic development efforts for Indian people and maximizing opportunities for
Indian control and self-determination shall be a major goal of our National Indian
policy." In 1975 Congress created the American Indian Policy Review Commission,
whose duty was to make a comprehensive investigation and study of Indian affairs.
'Tie Commission was designed to include Indian input and participation, and its recommendations may determine congressional policy for many years to come. See The
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304. Worcesterv. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
305. Goldberg, supra note 27o, at 535.
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